Selections from Athanasius, Festal Letter 4

For Monday of Lent Week 1

2 It is well, my beloved, to proceed from feast to feast; again festal meetings, again holy vigils arouse our minds, and compel our intellect to keep vigil unto contemplation of good things. Let us not fulfil these days like those that mourn, but, by enjoying spiritual food, let us seek to silence our fleshly lusts. For by these means we shall have strength to overcome our adversaries, like blessed Judith, when having first exercised herself in fastings and prayers, she overcame the enemies, and killed Olophernes. And blessed Esther, when destruction was about to come on all her race, and the nation of Israel was ready to perish, defeated the fury of the tyrant by no other means than by fasting and prayer to God, and changed the ruin of her people into safety. Now as those days are considered feasts for Israel, so also in old time feasts were appointed when an enemy was slain, or a conspiracy against the people broken up, and Israel delivered. Therefore blessed Moses of old time ordained the great feast of the Passover, and our celebration of it, because, namely, Pharaoh was killed, and the people were delivered from bondage. For in those times it was especially, when those who tyrannized over the people had been slain, that temporal feasts and holidays were observed in Judæa.

3. Now, however, that the devil, that tyrant against the whole world, is slain, we do not approach a temporal feast, my beloved, but an eternal and heavenly. Not in shadows do we show it forth, but we come to it in truth. For they being filled with the flesh of a dumb lamb, accomplished the feast, and having anointed their door-posts with the blood, implored aid against the destroyer. But now we, eating of the Word of the Father, and having the lintels of our hearts sealed with the blood of the New Testament, acknowledge the grace given us from the Saviour, who said, “Behold, I have given unto you to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy.” For no more does death reign; but instead of death henceforth is life, since our Lord said, “I am the life;” so that everything is filled with joy and gladness; as it is written, “The Lord reigns, let the earth rejoice.” For when death reigned, “sitting down by the rivers of Babylon, we wept,” and mourned, because we felt the bitterness of captivity; but now that death and the kingdom of the devil is abolished, everything is entirely filled with joy and gladness. And God is no longer known only in Judæa, but in all the earth, “their voice has gone forth, and the knowledge of Him has filled all the earth.” What follows, my beloved, is obvious; that we should approach such a feast, not with filthy raiment, but having clothed our minds with pure garments. For we need in this to put on our Lord Jesus, that we may be able to celebrate the feast with Him. Now we are clothed with Him when we love virtue, and are enemies to wickedness, when we exercise ourselves in temperance and mortify lasciviousness, when we love righteousness before iniquity, when we honour sufficiency, and have strength of mind, when we do not forget the poor, but open our doors to all men, when we assist humble-mindedness, but hate pride.

Selections from Athanasius, Festal Letter 3

For Friday after Ash Wednesday

1 Again, my beloved brethren, the day of the feast draws near to us, which, above all others, should be devoted to prayer, which the law commands to be observed, and which it would be an unholy thing for us to pass over in silence. . . . And we do not keep the festival as observers of days, knowing that the Apostle reproves those who do so, in those words which he spoke; “You observe days, and months, and times, and years.” But rather do we consider the day solemn because of the feast; so that all of us, who serve God in every place, may together in our prayers be well-pleasing to God. For the blessed Paul, announcing the nearness of gladness like this, did not announce days, but the Lord, for whose sake we keep the feast, saying, “Christ, our Passover, is sacrificed;” so that we all, contemplating the eternity of the Word, may draw near to do Him service.

2 For what else is the feast, but the service of the soul? And what is that service, but prolonged prayer to God, and unceasing thanksgiving? . . .

3 . . . Now, my beloved, our will ought to keep pace with the grace of God, and not fall short; lest while our will remains idle, the grace given us should begin to depart, and the enemy finding us empty and naked, should enter [into us], as was the case with him spoken of in the Gospel, from whom the devil went out; ‘for having gone through dry places, he took seven other spirits more wicked than himself; and returning and finding the house empty, he dwelt there, and the last state of that man was worse than the first.’ For the departure from virtue gives place for the entrance of the unclean spirit. There is, moreover, the apostolic injunction, that the grace given us should not be unprofitable; for those things which he wrote particularly to his disciple, he enforces on us through him , saying, ‘Neglect not the gift that is in you. . . .

4 . . . Therefore the blessed Paul, when desirous that the grace of the Spirit given to us should not grow cold, exhorts, saying, “Quench not the Spirit.” For so shall we remain partakers of Christ , if we hold fast to the end the Spirit given at the beginning. For he said, “Quench not;” not because the Spirit is placed in the power of men, and is able to suffer anything from them; but because bad and unthankful men are such as manifestly wish to quench it, since they, like the impure, persecute the Spirit with unholy deeds. “For the holy Spirit of discipline will flee deceit, nor dwell in a body that is subject unto sin; but will remove from thoughts that are without understanding.” Now they being without understanding, and deceitful, and lovers of sin, walk still as in darkness, not having that “Light which lights every man that comes into the world.” . . .

5 But the faithful and true servants of the Lord, knowing that the Lord loves the thankful, never cease to praise Him, ever giving thanks unto the Lord. And whether the time is one of ease or of affliction, they offer up praise to God with thanksgiving, not reckoning these things of time, but worshipping the Lord, the God of times. Thus of old time, Job, who possessed fortitude above all men, thought of these things when in prosperity; and when in adversity, he patiently endured, and when he suffered, gave thanks. As also the humble David, in the very time of affliction sang praises and said, “I will bless the Lord at all times.” And the blessed Paul, in all his Epistles, so to say, ceased not to thank God. In times of ease, he failed not, and in afflictions he gloried, knowing that ‘tribulation works patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and that hope makes not ashamed.” Let us, being followers of such men, pass no season without thanksgiving, but especially now, when the time is one of tribulation, which the heretics excite against us, will we praise the Lord, uttering the words of the saints; “All these things have come upon us, yet have we not forgotten You.” For as the Jews at that time, although suffering an assault from the tabernacles of the Edomites, and oppressed by the enemies of Jerusalem, did not give themselves up, but all the more sang praises to God; so we, my beloved brethren, though hindered from speaking the word of the Lord, will the more proclaim it, and being afflicted, we will sing Psalms , in that we are accounted worthy to be despised, and to labour anxiously for the truth. Yea, moreover, being grievously vexed, we will give thanks. For the blessed Apostle, who gave thanks at all times, urges us in the same manner to draw near to God saying, “Let your requests, with thanksgiving, be made known unto God.” And being desirous that we should always continue in this resolution, he says, “At all times give thanks; pray without ceasing.” . . . Each one of us having in his hand the staff which came out of the root of Jesse, and our feet shod with the preparation of the Gospel , let us keep the feast as Paul says, “Not with the old leaven, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth;” reverently trusting that we are reconciled through Christ, and not departing from faith in Him, nor do we defile ourselves together with heretics, and strangers to the truth, whose conversation and whose will degrade them. But rejoicing in afflictions, we break through the furnace of iron and darkness, and pass, unharmed, over that terrible Red Sea. Thus also, when we look upon the confusion of heretics, we shall, with Moses, sing that great song of praise, and say, ‘We will sing unto the Lord, for He is to be gloriously praised.” Thus, singing praises, and seeing that the sin which is in us has been cast into the sea, we pass over to the wilderness. And being first purified by the fast of forty days, by prayers, and fastings, and discipline, and good works, we shall be able to eat the holy Passover in Jerusalem.

6 . . . Let us at all times give thanks to the Lord; through Whom to the Father be glory and dominion, in the Holy Ghost, for ever and ever. Amen. . . .

Selections from Athanasius, Festal Letter 2

For Thursday after Ash Wednesday

1 Again, my brethren, is Easter come and gladness; again the Lord has brought us to this season; so that when, according to custom, we have been nourished with His words, we may duly keep the feast. Let us celebrate it then, even heavenly joy, with those saints who formerly proclaimed a like feast, and were ensamples to us of conversation[1. The English translation of the Syriac text is from 1854, revised and edited in 1891 for Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, in vol. 4 of The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 2, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (1892; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995). Therefore, the English usage is sometimes archaic, as in the case of ensample (= example) and conversation (= general course of actions or habits, manner of conducting oneself in the world).] in Christ. . . .

2 Let us then, as is becoming, as at all times, yet especially in the days of the feast, be not hearers only, but doers of the commandments of our Saviour; that having imitated the behaviour of the saints, we may enter together into the joy of our Lord which is in heaven, which is not transitory, but truly abides; of which evil doers having deprived themselves, there remains to them as the fruit of their ways, sorrow and affliction, and groaning with torments. Let a man see what these become like, that they bear not the likeness of the conversation of the saints, nor of that right understanding, by which man at the beginning was rational, and in the image of God. . . .

5 Oh! My brethren, how shall we admire the loving-kindness of the Saviour? With what power, and with what a trumpet should a man cry out, exalting these His benefits! That not only should we bear His image, but should receive from Him an example and pattern of heavenly conversation; that as He has begun, we should go on, that suffering, we should not threaten, being reviled, we should not revile again, but should bless them that curse, and in everything commit ourselves to God who judges righteously. For those who are thus disposed, and fashion themselves according to the Gospel, will be partakers of Christ, and imitators of apostolic conversation, on account of which they shall be deemed worthy of that praise from him, with which he praised the Corinthians, when he said, “I praise you that in everything you are mindful of me.” . . .

7 . . . Now some have related the wonderful signs performed by our Saviour, and preached His eternal Godhead. And others have written of His being born in the flesh of the Virgin, and have proclaimed the festival of the holy passover, saying, “Christ our Passover is sacrificed” so that we, individually and collectively, and all the churches in the world may remember, as it is written, “That Christ rose from the dead, of the seed of David, according to the Gospel.” And let us not forget that which Paul delivered, declaring it to the Corinthians; I mean His resurrection, whereby “He destroyed him that had the power of death, that is, the devil” and raised us up together with Him, having loosed the bands of death, and vouchsafed a blessing instead of a curse, joy instead of grief, a feast instead of mourning, in this holy joy of Easter, which being continually in our hearts, we always rejoice, as Paul commanded; “We pray without ceasing; in everything we give thanks.” So we are not remiss in giving notice of its seasons, as we have received from the Fathers. Again we write, again keeping to the apostolic traditions, we remind each other when we come together for prayer; and keeping the feast in common, with one mouth we truly give thanks to the Lord. Thus giving thanks unto Him, and being followers of the saints, “we shall make our praise in the Lord all the day,” as the Psalmist says. So, when we rightly keep the feast, we shall be counted worthy of that joy which is in heaven. . . .

Selections from Athanasius, Festal Letter 1

For Ash Wednesday

1 Come, my beloved, the season calls us to keep the feast. Again, “the Sun of Righteousness,” causing His divine beams to rise upon us, proclaims beforehand the time of the feast, in which, obeying Him, we ought to celebrate it, lest when the time has passed by, gladness likewise may pass us by. For discerning the time is one of the duties most urgent on us, for the practice of virtue. . . .

4 . . . Listen, as in a figure, to the prophet blowing the trumpet; and further, having turned to the truth, be ready for the announcement of the trumpet, for he saith, “Blow ye the trumpet in Sion: sanctify a fast.” This is a warning trumpet, and commands with great earnestness, that when we fast, we should hallow the fast. For not all those who call upon God, hallow God, since there are some who defile Him; yet not Him—that is impossible—but their own mind concerning Him; for He is holy, and has pleasure in the saints. And therefore the blessed Paul accuses those who dishonour God; “Transgressors of the law dishonour God.” So then, to make a separation from those who pollute the fast, he saith here, “sanctify the fast.” For many, crowding to the fast, pollute themselves in the thoughts of their hearts, sometimes by doing evil against their brethren, sometimes by daring to defraud. And, to mention nothing else, there are many who exalt themselves above their neighbours, thereby causing great mischief.

5 Behold, my brethren, how much a fast can do, and in what manner the law commands us to fast. It is required that not only with the body should we fast, but with the soul. Now the soul is humbled when it does not follow wicked opinions, but feeds on becoming virtues. For virtues and vices are the food of the soul, and it can eat either of these two meats, and incline to either of the two, according to its own will. . . . And as our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, being heavenly bread, is the food of the saints, according to this; “Unless you eat My flesh, and drink My blood;” so is the devil the food of the impure, and of those who do nothing which is of the light, but work the deeds of darkness. Therefore, in order to withdraw and turn them from vices, He commands them to be nourished with the food of virtue; namely, humbleness of mind, lowliness to endure humiliations, the acknowledgment of God. For not only does such a fast as this obtain pardon for souls, but being kept holy, it prepares the saints, and raises them above the earth.

6 . . . Let no man lightly fall into unbelief; but rather let him believe and know that the contemplation of God, and the word which is from Him, suffice to nourish those who hear, and stand to them in place of all food. For the angels are no otherwise sustained than by beholding at all times the face of the Father, and of the Saviour who is in heaven. . . .

11 Let us remember the poor, and not forget kindness to strangers; above all, let us love God with all our soul, and might, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves. So may we receive those things which the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man, which God has prepared for those that love Him, through His only Son, our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ; through Whom, to the Father alone, by the Holy Ghost, be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen. . . .

Toward Lent: Historical Observations

After a lifetime of being typically Restorationist about the liturgical calendar, this year I am observing Lent and following the readings of the Revised Common Lectionary (you can subscribe to a useful calendar here). If you come from a background like mine, in which such practices are foreign, you may wonder what this is all about.

The earliest indications we have of practices akin to Lent and the annual celebration of Easter are found in the second-century disputes known commonly as the Paschal Controversy. Essentially, a debate ensued regarding the proper date of the annual celebration of Jesus’s passion and resurrection, as many churches celebrated on the Sunday (“Lord’s Day”) following the first full moon of spring, but some churches celebrated according to the date of the Jewish Passover, which may not fall on a Sunday.

Eusebius of Caesarea, in his Church History (Hist. eccl.) written in the early fourth century, tells the story:

1. A question of no small importance arose at that time [after the tenth year of Commodus, ca. AD 190]. For the parishes of all Asia, as from an older tradition, held that the fourteenth day of the moon, on which day the Jews were commanded to sacrifice the lamb, should be observed as the feast of the Saviour’s passover. It was therefore necessary to end their fast on that day, whatever day of the week it should happen to be. But it was not the custom of the churches in the rest of the world to end it at this time, as they observed the practice which, from apostolic tradition, has prevailed to the present time, of terminating the fast on no other day than on that of the resurrection of our Saviour. (Hist. eccl. 5.23.1)

Councils and conferences ensued. Letters were exchanged. The conflict grew heated. Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 5.24.9–18) continues:

9. Thereupon Victor, who presided over the church at Rome, immediately attempted to cut off from the common unity the parishes of all Asia, with the churches that agreed with them, as heterodox; and he wrote letters and declared all the brethren there wholly excommunicate.

10. But this did not please all the bishops. And they besought him to consider the things of peace, and of neighborly unity and love. Words of theirs are extant, sharply rebuking Victor.

11. Among them was Irenaeus, who, sending letters in the name of the brethren in Gaul over whom he presided, maintained that the mystery of the resurrection of the Lord should be observed only on the Lord’s day. He fittingly admonishes Victor that he should not cut off whole churches of God which observed the tradition of an ancient custom and after many other words he proceeds as follows:

12. For the controversy is not only concerning the day, but also concerning the very manner of the fast. For some think that they should fast one day, others two, yet others more; some, moreover, count their day as consisting of forty hours day and night.

13. And this variety in its observance has not originated in our time; but long before in that of our ancestors. It is likely that they did not hold to strict accuracy, and thus formed a custom for their posterity according to their own simplicity and peculiar mode. Yet all of these lived none the less in peace, and we also live in peace with one another; and the disagreement in regard to the fast confirms the agreement in the faith.

14. He adds to this the following account, which I may properly insert:

Among these were the presbyters before Soter, who presided over the church which you now rule. We mean Anicetus, and Pius, and Hyginus, and Telesphorus, and Xystus. They neither observed it themselves, nor did they permit those after them to do so. And yet though not observing it, they were none the less at peace with those who came to them from the parishes in which it was observed; although this observance was more opposed to those who did not observe it.

15. But none were ever cast out on account of this form; but the presbyters before you who did not observe it, sent the eucharist to those of other parishes who observed it.

16. And when the blessed Polycarp was at Rome in the time of Anicetus, and they disagreed a little about certain other things, they immediately made peace with one another, not caring to quarrel over this matter. For neither could Anicetus persuade Polycarp not to observe what he had always observed with John the disciple of our Lord, and the other apostles with whom he had associated; neither could Polycarp persuade Anicetus to observe it as he said that he ought to follow the customs of the presbyters that had preceded him.

17. But though matters were in this shape, they communed together, and Anicetus conceded the administration of the eucharist in the church to Polycarp, manifestly as a mark of respect. And they parted from each other in peace, both those who observed, and those who did not, maintaining the peace of the whole church.

18. Thus Irenaeus, who truly was well named, became a peacemaker in this matter, exhorting and negotiating in this way in behalf of the peace of the churches. And he conferred by letter about this mooted question, not only with Victor, but also with most of the other rulers of the churches.

A historical textbook is useful for parsing what Eusebius condenses here. For example, Everett Ferguson’s discussion of the Paschal controversies in Church History, vol. 1, lists dates for the leadership of the bishops mentioned, clarifying the fact that the controversy had been ongoing for a number of decades at the time of Irenaeus’s intervention: “The earliest documentation for different customs is Irenaeus’s reference to bishop Sixtus (115–25) of Rome not making a test of fellowship over the different customs. . . . He further records a visit of Polycarp to Anicetus (155–66) in Rome in which they disagreed on the Paschal observance yet maintained peace with each other.”[1. Everett Ferguson, Church History, vol. 1, From Christ to the Pre-Reformation: The Rise and Growth of the Church in Its Cultural, Intellectual, and Political Context (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), 140.]

A uniform practice did not emerge until the Council of Nicaea addressed the matter definitively in AD 325 (two hundred years after Sixtus!). In the mean time, the practice of writing “festal letters” developed, in which a bishop would annually announce the proper time of the festival. The earliest mention of such letters is found in Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 7.20, in his discussion of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria (d. AD 264). Apparently, the practice was especially typical of Alexandrian bishops, and some have claimed that this was due to the Alexandrians’ renowned facility with astronomical calculations.

In any case, a few interesting points arise from Eusebius’s history (I have bolded the phrases I find noteworthy in the text above).

1. Irenaeus is clear that even the Apostles observed a yearly celebration of the passion and resurrection. He, and his direct source Polycarp, are close enough in time to the Apostles that the practice is living memory.

2. There was a fast associated with the observance, broken on the day of the celebration of the resurrection. The dispute was about the length of the fast, not the practice itself. In other words, Irenaeus says that, according to Polycarp, the Apostle John and the other Apostles fasted before their annual Paschal celebration. This is a significant basis for the later development of Lent.

3. Whatever one makes of such practices or their later developments, the example of Polycarp and Anicetus communing together despite their differences is a stunning demonstration of Irenaeus’s claim that “the disagreement in regard to the fast confirms the agreement in the faith.” The diversity of practices “according to their own simplicity and peculiar mode” was not only acceptable but was unable to break their spiritual communion. The same should hold today!

In subsequent posts I will share selections from the festal letters of Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria from AD 328 to 373.

On Narrative Inquiry: A Reading Review

[I wrote this reading review for a doctoral seminar on Methods for Observing and Interpreting Culture.]

What understandings of human narrativity underlie narrative inquiry in the social sciences? This is, broadly, the question with which I began this directed reading. In the following reading review, I will expand on the research context of this question and then review each of the four volumes I read.

Research Context

A theological agenda guides these readings. In particular, I have ventured into the missiological engagement with social sciences in order to broaden a conception of human narrativity already informed by research in theological and philosophical anthropology. I am developing this conception of narrativity in service of a biblical hermeneutic that takes seriously the role of the reader and, therefore, the anthropological description of the reader. While narrative theology and theological hermeneutics contribute significantly to the characterization of the reader’s narrativity, and those conversations engage routinely with philosophers who have pioneered anthropological notions of narrativity, I find myself drawn to a robustly missiological exploration of the topic for a few related reasons.

First, I am developing a specifically missional hermeneutic. This means, on the one hand, that a missional theology informs my theological hermeneutic. On the other hand, intercultural missiology stands to contribute significantly to missional hermeneutics—a contribution ironically underappreciated in the mostly US American context of the conversation. In my view, missional hermeneutics should be rooted in both the ecclesial practices of mission and the studied reflection on those practices that missiology uniquely entails.

Second, among the theological curricula, the discipline of missiology critically engages the social sciences in a way that is vital for missional hermeneutics. Biblical hermeneutics has remained at least tenuously connected to the social sciences through philosophers like Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose engagement with Wilhelm Dilthey identifies hermeneutics as a social-scientific concern, as well as through linguistics and, more tangentially, through archaeology and history. Missiology’s focus on intercultural studies, however, has placed it in far more substantive dialogue with the social sciences. Biblical hermeneutics should benefit from an intercultural understanding of interpretation. More specifically, a readerly approach like mine, which finds theological anthropology to be hermeneutically essential, can gain as much from the social sciences as from its more traditional interlocutor, philosophical anthropology.

Third, the study of worldview in particular is a hermeneutical concern to which missiology has given consideration. My attention was first drawn to narrative studies through the work of Paul Hiebert, whose diachronic analysis of worldviews focuses on narratives “at the core of worldviews.”[1. Paul G. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews: An Anthropological Understanding of How People Change (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 66.] The relationship between worldview and hermeneutics is complex, and its explanation is beyond the scope of these introductory remarks, but, in short, worldview functions as an analytic paradigm for the anthropological characterization of readers. Taking narrative as the “core” of worldview, therefore, puts the narrativity of readers at center stage and calls for specific methods of narrative analysis.

Such an assumption, however, raises significant questions. Various leading philosophers have discussed the importance of human narrativity in recent years (and narrative theology has relied on these), but how do social-scientific conceptions of narrative’s role in human life relate or compare? Undoubtedly, the “narrative turn” in both fields have similar roots, and the booming social-scientific subdiscipline of narrative research obviously assumes the importance of narrative for understanding humans. Yet, how is the function of narrative conceived and, more importantly, operationalized in the methods of narrative analysis? Is narrativity an ontological reality of human nature that narrative analysis seeks to understand, or is narrative analysis a primarily utilitarian approach, given that human minds organize experience narratively, making narratives and narration the most useful units of analysis? Is narrative merely a metaphor for the sequential, teleological configuration of human experience, or do narratives per se truly exercise power over human culture and individual people? In other words, how do social-scientific methods of narrative analysis help us understand the narrativity of readers? With these questions in mind, I turn to my reading review.

Reading Review

  1. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000). 232 pp.

Jean Clandinin and Michael Connelly write as experts in the field of teacher education. Their experience and the examples they bring to bear are centered in the research of educational environments and educators. This does not make the book uninteresting to researchers in other fields, however, and it serves well as an exemplar of narrative inquiry in qualitative research more broadly. Theirs is a somewhat unique perspective, nonetheless. I will overview their approach to narrative inquiry, highlighting its uniqueness, and then return to the book’s relevance to my particular concerns.

The authors begin, in the first three chapters, with an apology for narrative inquiry and establish a rough theoretical framework for the endeavor. In the process, they contrast the concerns and assumptions of “thinking narratively” with “technical rationalism” (36), engaging thereby in the broader debate between more and less positivistic methods in qualitative research. In sum, they reject various kinds of formalism and reductionism that override the experiences of people (participants and researchers alike) with techniques, theories, and universal models. “The answer to the question, Why narrative? is, Because experience” (50).

In chapter four, the book’s unique pivot happens. Titled “What Do Narrative Inquirers Do?,” the bulk of the chapter consists of narratives of researchers’ experiences of inquiry. Surprisingly, there was nothing concretely methodological or procedural in the chapter. The authors even admit, when they come to such matters in chapter eight, that they might have been at home in chapter four given its title, but the move was intentional. The book’s emphasis falls on the researcher’s narrative as much—and sometimes seemingly more—than the narratives ostensibly under investigation: “It is not only the participants’ stories that are retold by a narrative inquirer. In our cases, it is also the inquirers’ (Michael’s and Jean’s) stories that are open for inquiry and retelling” (60). This seems to go beyond typical construals of reflexivity, and the oddity of the proposal in the context of the authors’ discipline is, indeed, part of the story they tell: “We had a file of journal rejections that came about, in part, because reviewers and editors did not see the social significance of the work and tended to see it as only personal. They often labeled the work idiosyncratic and narcissistic” (121). In my view, their difficulty regarding disciplinary justification is largely due to a failure of epistemological explicitness. Throughout chapters five and six, it is clear that “intimate relationships” (88) and even “intimate coparticipation in the intermingling of narratives” (66) is the premise of their extreme reflexivity. In other words, theirs is a relational epistemology—a narrative relational epistemology. One passage is highly representative:

Narrative inquiry is much more than “look for and hear story.” Narrative inquiry in the field is a form of living, a way of life. Of course, there have been well-known, well-publicized narrative inquiries where researcher-driven interviews supported by tape recorders have been the method. These may be appropriate for their purpose but should not be mistaken for the whole of narrative inquiry. Most important, they should not be mistaken for what narrative inquirers do when they are in for the long haul and when they are working toward intimacy of relationship. Narrative inquiry, from this point of view, is one of trying to make sense of life as lived. To begin with, it is trying to figure out the taken-for-grantedness. And when that taken-for-grantedness begins also to be taken for granted by the researcher, then the researcher can begin to participate in and see things that worked in, for example, the hospital ward, the classroom, the organization. (78)

This reflexive, relational intimacy is critical for “thinking narratively,” which contrasts with learning set narrative inquiry methods. Clandinin and Connelly also offer insight into composing field texts, doing analysis, composing research papers, and so forth, but the key to their proposal is role of the researcher’s own narrative experience.

I return briefly to my concerns with the view of narrativity at work in social-scientific research. The authors explicitly begin with their indebtedness to Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of the “narrative unity” of life. This they welded onto their theoretical point of departure, John Dewey’s concept of the continuity of experience. “Narrative unity became for us a way to think in a more detailed and informative way about the general construct of continuity in individuals’ lives. Continuity became for us a narrative construction that opened up a floodgate of ideas and possibilities” (3). In other words, narrative is a philosophical notion that does helpful conceptual work. Yet, Clandinin and Connelly also review a handful of diverse social scientists’ uses of narrative and devise an important distinction between two types. Some have a “sense of a methodologist’s opportunism. They seem to say that life and narrative are linked because the link seems to work” (18). For these, narrative is essentially a useful, borrowed metaphor. Others “argue naturalistically along the line that ‘this is the way the world is, and therefore this is how it should be thought about.’ . . . Experience happens narratively” (19). Clandinin and Connelly agree with the second type, concluding that “narrative is both the phenomenon and the method of the social sciences” (18). Thus, while they learned the concept of narrative from MacIntyre, mere opportunism does not motivate their narrative inquiry. Rather, it is a realization that “experience happens narratively” that sets the agenda for the production of social-scientific knowledge.

Catherine Kohler Riessman, Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008). 264 pp.

Catherine Kohler Riessman’s volume is a delightfully clear and concise yet substantive treatment of—just as the title indicates—narrative methods for the human sciences. The first chapter is a very useful introduction to narrative studies in the social sciences, including definitional discussion of narrative and narrative analysis as well as a short historical overview of the “narrative turn.” I will return to the implications of chapter one for my questions after a short review of the rest of the book.

Following the introduction, the subsequent organization of the book is eminently reasonable. The second chapter reflects “consciously and critically about how we as interpreters constitute the narrative texts that we then analyze” (22), first considering “narrative interviewing” and then focusing at length on the interpretive nature of transcription. The next three chapters deal with one methodological locus each: thematic analysis or the “what” of narratives, structural analysis or the “how” of narration, and dialogic/performance analysis or the “who” of narration. Chapter six deals with “visual analysis,” taking visual artifacts as narrative “texts” and, consequently, pushing the boundaries of the author’s definition of narrative. A final chapter treats epistemological and ethical issues in a cursory fashion, though I find the simplicity and forthrightness of Riessman’s advice refreshing: be ethical toward participants, be transparent with methods and epistemology, be persuasive toward readers, and let peers judge the usefulness and trustworthiness of findings in the long term. Each of the four chapters on methods of analysis works through multiple examples and ends with an exceedingly useful comparative summary table. Altogether, these chapters amount to various forms of “close reading” (11–12) that will seem familiar to students of textual hermeneutics.

Still, these more textually oriented approaches to analysis can proceed without answering the question: Why narrative? Particularly since “not everything is narrative,” it appears that Riessman’s narrative methods are simply genre-specific interpretive tools. A narrative entails “a sequenced storyline, specific characters, and the particulars of a setting” (5), and narrative methods apply to a specifically narrative text. This is still relatively inclusive: “The term narrative in the human sciences can refer to texts at several levels that overlap: stories told by research participants (which are themselves interpretive), interpretive accounts developed by an investigator based on interviews and fieldwork observation (a story about stories), and even the narrative a reader constructs after engaging with the participant’s and investigator’s narratives” (6). Nonetheless, the form of narrative is what constitutes “narrative data.” In view of such limits, one might conclude that narrative analysis has little to do with any anthropological phenomenon apart from the product of storytelling.

But why do people tell stories in the first place? Riessman calls the practice of storytelling “the narrative impulse—a universal way of knowing and communicating” (6), following Roland Barthes. And although “scholars debate whether there is such a thing as prenarrative experience” (7), still “many investigators are now turning to narrative because the stories reveal truths about human experience” (10). Again, why the epistemic privilege? The answer seems to lie in the narrative constitution of identity. Citing early narrative theorist Jerome Bruner, Riessman states: “Individuals, he argues, become the autobiographical narratives by which they tell about their lives. To be understood, these private constructions of identity must mesh with a community of life stories, or ‘deep structures’ about the nature of life itself in a particular culture” (10). This sounds very similar to the function of narrative in Hiebert’s conception of worldview. In contrast with Clandinin and Connelly, Riessman defers the question of the nature of human experience and links the narrative turn to scholarly interest in the nature of human identity. This is still a concern with “truths about human experience,” but the issue is really that the narrative configuration of human experiences functions (whether necessarily or not) in seemingly universal ways, resulting ultimately in identity formation.

Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, and Barbara Laslett, Telling Stories: The Use of Personal Narratives in the Social Sciences and History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 200 pp.

Telling Stories sustains a single argument throughout the majority of its pages: “analyses of personal narratives, beyond the contributions they make to specific areas of empirical research, can also serve to reorient theories about the relationship between the individual and the social by calling attention to the social and cultural dynamics through which individuals construct themselves as social actors” (2). This focus highlights an important aspect of narrativity to which the previous two volumes gave little attention, namely, the relationship between the personal and the cultural dimensions of narrativity. Worldview is typically discussed as a cultural phenomenon rather than an individual one. “Personal narrative analysis, by contrast, builds from the individual and the personal. It gleans insight not only from subjective perceptions about social phenomena and events as revealed through participants’ stories, but more particularly through narrative forms of experiencing, recalling, and making sense of social action. Subjectivity and narrativity are at the core of the alternative epistemological presumptions associated with personal narrative analysis” (10). At the same time, “personal narrative evidence can never be taken as a transparent description of ‘experience’ or a straightforward expression of identity. . . . Personal narratives are complex forms of evidence that demand sophisticated analytic techniques that build on the recognition of their location at the intersection of the individual and the social” (41). Personal narratives, therefore, mediate neither experience nor identity apart from social context.

Chapters two through four identify three primary social mediations that narrative analysis should take into account: historical context, culturally available forms of narration, and the intersubjectivity of the research encounter. Regarding historical context, the authors’ claim is not merely that context is important but that the personal agency expressed in narratives is always historical agency. Historical context, in other words, sets limits (consciously or unconsciously) on the plot of any given personal narrative. The point regarding available forms of narration is similar. Every culture has a limited store of “plots that circulate” (76). Understanding how a personal narrative uses, ignores, or adapts available narratives is vital. Finally, attention to intersubjectivity relates directly to the previous two points. The production of personal narratives is not only limited by historical context and available forms but also by the researcher’s influence on them—for example, by representing historical context one way or another or by (even passively) eliciting one available narrative form instead of another. One way of putting this is that, through narrative inquiry, researchers access not participants’ narratively configured human experience per se but their narratively configured experience of being researched. The final chapter turns to epistemological issues regarding the validity of arguments based on narrative sources, in relation to the predominance of positivist social science.

For my purposes, the book’s main idea is the valuable take-away. Like Riessman, though even more so, the authors utilize a formal, narrow notion of personal narrative: “a retrospective first-person account of the evolution of an individual life over time and in social context” (4). Nonetheless, even though narratives rather than narrativity are at the fore, experience and identity remain in view, described primarily as “agency.” Moreover, the authors bring out an important new consideration: embodiment. “Personal narrative analysis is an effective method of demonstrating how individual agency is operative in a particular context even while located in an embodied self evolving over time and over the life course” (32). The emplotted self that narrative research investigates is an embodied self. Narrativity has to do with the agency of bodily humans, not the configuration of disembodied experience. Telling Stories, then, implies an understanding of narrativity as embodied historical agency emplotted according to cultural scripts and intersubjective influences.

James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, eds. Varieties of Narrative Analysis (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011). 328 pp.

My final reading, Varieties of Narrative Analysis, is an edited volume that, naturally, encompasses a variety of arguments, some of which are more useful than others in relation to my research agenda. To a significant extent, the organization of Varieties of Narrative Analysis follows Riessman’s three primary modes of analysis (what, how, and who?). Accordingly, the book’s sections are titled “Analyzing Stories,” “Analyzing Storytelling,” and “Analyzing Stories in Society.” This serves the editors’ aim “to adjust the methodological balance by bringing together, under the rubric of narrative analysis, a broad range of approaches that moves beyond, but does not exclude, the content of personal stories” (4). Many of the essays contained in this volume serve well to extend the concerns already voiced in the previous three readings. From Clandinin and Connelly’s radical reflexivity, to Riessman’s multifaceted close reading, to Maynes, Pierce, and Laslett’s embodied contextuality, Varieties of Narrative Analysis offers examples of and reflections on related analytical methods.

Aside from the utterly fascinating studies sprinkled throughout the book, the essays that caught my attention in the context of my research dealt with identity formation, corroborating Riessman’s claim that the narrative turn has been motivated by interest in that phenomenon. For example, the lead essay, by psychologist Dan McAdams, refers straightaway to “what many psychologists today term narrative identity” (16). Likewise, Arthur Frank develops the concept of “holding one’s own” through storytelling, which means “seeking to sustain the value of one’s self or identity in response to whatever threatens to diminish that self or identity” (33). Michael Bamberg’s essay, “Narrative Practice and Identity Navigation,” helpfully locates narrative identity in relation to my research question:

With regard to what is special about narratives, it is commonly held that narratives serve the purpose for passing along and handing down culturally shared values, so that individuals learn to position their own values and actions in relationship to established and shared categories and, in doing so, engage in their own formation process as a person. It was this function that inspired a good deal of the narrative turn in the social sciences and humanities because it highlights the relevance of narrative in the identity formation processes of institutional and personal continuities. Functioning to position a sense of self in relation to culturally shared values and existing normative discourses, narrative discourse claims a special status in the business of identity construction. (103)

This brings me full circle to the question: why is it commonly held that narrative function in this way? As the quotation avers, across the diverse methods of narrative analysis represented in this volume, the theoretical use of narrative identity proceeds on the assumption that both shared and personal narratives do indeed function to form both personal and communal identity. But what is the basis of the assumption? I do not ask the question out of a desire for an archaeology of the concept, as though that would justify its various usages. Rather, it seems to me that highlighting the assumption clarifies the sort of contribution to the conceptualization of narrativity that the social sciences stand to make: it is ultimately a pragmatic testing of a borrowed concept. In general, the argument seems to be not that a well-founded theory of human narrativity (whether experiential or constructivist) justifies narrative inquiry but that the effectiveness of narrative inquiry in providing useful psychological, sociological, and anthropological explanations confirms an assumed theory of narrativity. The assumed theory is typically borrowed in the form of a philosophical assertion. For example, similar to Clandinin and Connelly, Donileen Loseke begins with McIntyre: “Because humans are ‘story telling animals’ (McIntyre, 1984, p. 216) and because storytelling ‘may be the way through which human beings make sense of their own lives and the lives of others’ (McAdams, 1995, p. 297, emphasis original), it is not surprising that we live in a ‘culture of story-telling’ (Weeks, 1998, p. 46)” (252). Therefore, we expect to understand a culture and the human beings it comprises through analysis of their stories. But the assumed theory appears to become implicit in much of the narrative analysis literature—perhaps because it has been sufficiently confirmed—in which cases it appears that narrative analysis is justified because it works, regardless of why it works. No doubt there are some purely utilitarian social scientists in the mix. But I suspect that narrative inquiry is more frequently playing a long epistemological game in which the effectiveness of narrative analysis is not merely a self-justification but an argument for understanding human nature as such. The reason narrative analysis provides such unique insight into human experience is human narrativity; conversely, the unique insights of narrative analysis demonstrate human narrativity. Why can we say that people live storied lives, that individuals have narrative identities, that cultures have master narratives, or that worldviews have narrative cores? In view of these readings, I suggest that narrative inquiry in the social sciences answers: because narrative analysis has consistently tested and proven the narrativity of human beings.

Theological Education and Identity Politics: On Listening Carefully

This post is just a sketch of a major issue that looms in the background of my doctoral studies. As the landscape of twenty-first century theological education is rearranged by seismic cultural forces, one of the major shakeups is precipitated by the larger conflict about identity politics in American culture.

In this context, I believe it is imperative for me to assume the posture of a careful listener. So I’ve been thinking about what that means.

Who Is Listening?

I’m a straight white guy. Confession: I don’t accept that as my identity. I do accept that those characteristics shape my experience of everything else that defines my identity.

I’m an aspiring professor. I will, God willing, be writing syllabi and assigning reading soon. I will be interacting with all sorts of students, and leading class discussions in which identity politics is inevitably at play, for good or ill.

I’m a missionary and a student of missiology and theology. I have lived as a minority in a dominant culture that was not my own. I have confronted consciously and conscientiously the issues of race, nationality, economic privilege, and cultural difference—not to mention gender dynamics in a machista culture—that haunted me in missional and ecclesial contexts. This means, first and foremost, that white normativity makes perfect conceptual sense to me. It’s the very thing I was trained to divest by becoming a humble learner and vulnerable participant in Peruvian culture. As a student of missiology, I listen with an ear attuned to postcolonialism, which is more at home among intercultural studies (the a la mode name for missiology) than anywhere in the theological academy. As a student of theology, I listen with many commitments that necessarily shape my interaction with the commitments embedded in identity politics. The latter do not control the former, but listening carefully means they do get a critical hearing.

Listening From Where?

I’m a PhD student at Fuller Theological Seminary. Conversations about race have been tense on campus since I arrived in Pasadena. Recently, they have reached a fevered pitch.

A couple of articles reporting the situation, including links and video:

Fuller’s official responses:

The ongoing forum in which I’ve participated (note the useful bibliography at the bottom of the page):

In this context, I’m listening in order to understand what is really at issue. It doesn’t seem straightforward to me, nor does it seem that the public articulation of the problem has progressed to anything like a meaningful dialogue. I’ve been required to read pretty broadly throughout my graduate and postgraduate education—despite the fact that my MDiv program could be taken as a paradigm for white male homogeneity—and encouraged to recognize the white, Western, male character of dominant theology. So I’m trying to understand what, on a class-by-class and an institutional level, should be happening. But I’m listening as someone who has felt chastened all along and is somewhat perplexed by the idea that my institutions have failed to challenge my white normativity or teach me about institutionalized racism or give me the tools for ideological self-critique. I suspect, therefore, that the root issue is the experiences of minorities, so that’s what I’m listening to understand.

Listening How?

I’m listening as someone who believes that listening carefully involves asking questions. Yet, in the current milieu, it feels like I’m expected to shut up and listen. It feels as though any question I might ask sincerely in search of clarification will be thrown back at me as evidence of my white normativity. I often get the sense that, because I’m a straight white guy, asking questions is a micro-agression or a power play. So I’ve been listening sort of desperately, without asking questions.

I also think listening carefully involves attending to multiple perspectives. And this is the real sticking point with identity politics. It is all knotted up with tensions between free thought and advocacy, and it is prone to reflexively dismiss or even demonize those who tend toward thought that is free from advocacy. While I think the claims of the free-thought camp are sometimes naïve and overblown (I’m thinking of Paul Griffiths at Duke last year), to say nothing of those who are outright disingenuous, I also recognize a growing tendency among the advocacy camp to shut down interlocutors who don’t fall in line, by bullying or political brute force if necessary. So I’m also giving a hearing to those who reasonably critique the excesses of identity politics. This Quillette article, “Identity Politics Does More Harm Than Good to Minorities,” is an exemplar:

Conceiving identity politics

I’ll end this patchwork of thoughts with some information for those who might be wondering just what identity politics is. The term gets bandied about a lot these days, often vaguely. The quoted definition in the Quillette article is helpful, but a broader perspective might be of more use. (The following is adapted from a group project completed for my Methods for Observing and Interpreting Culture seminar, used with the permission of my colleagues.)

Cultural studies is the broader context of identity politics.

Generally, cultural studies is what it claims to be: the study of culture. But in particular, it is the study of the dynamics of power and authority in sub-cultures and emphasizes gender, race, class, and sexuality in everyday life. Cultural studies isn’t neutral but is biased toward the margins or fringes of society. It is a “radical anti-elitist critique” (Miller 2001, 11) and is shaped by the following concerns: (1) The focus on everyday life and its practices; (2) a shift away from classical or elite cultural forms to popular or industrially produced forms (such as cinema, television, radio, popular magazines); and (3) the focus on ways in which power and authority are exercised in cultural practices.

Experience is the vital concern of cultural studies.

“Experience acts as a methodological touchstone in sounding an insistence on the significance of listening to others and attending to what is relatively distinctive in their way of knowing their immediate social world, for it is only by doing this that we can glean any sense of what is involved in their subjectivities, self-formation, life histories and participation in social and cultural identities. . . . What is crucial is how we understand the bearings which any expressive cultural form has on socially and historically specific experience and how this articulates with broader determinate structures of social life. . . . It is the subjective dimension of lived social worlds that experience occupies, and it is this which is central to the concerns of cultural studies.” (Pickering 2008, 23–24)

Identity politics is a subset of cultural studies.

“In literary and cultural theory, discussions of identity politics have focused on the link between subjective experience and social identity as the central issue that needs to be analyzed.” (Mohanty 2011)

Identity Politics entails a theoretical concern with the tensions involved in the construction of, for example, racial identities: between “subjective experiences and objective social locations” (Mohanty 2011), identification and representation, “my public identity and my lived self.” (Alcoff 2000)

The social construction of identity does not preclude its “reality.”

“Identities refer outward to objective and causally significant features of the world, . . . they are thus non-arbitrary, and . . . experience provides both an epistemic and political basis for understanding.” (Alcoff 2000)

“Social identities are often carried on the body, materially inscribed, perceived at a glance by well-disciplined perceptual practices, and thus hardly the mere epiphenomena of discourse.” (Alcoff 2000)

Sources

Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Who’s Afraid of Identity Politics?” in Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, edited by Paula M. L. Moya and Michael Hames-García, ch. 10. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.

Miller, Toby. “What it is and what it isn’t: Introducing . . . Cultural Studies.” In A Companion to Cultural Studies, edited by Toby Miller, 1–20. Blackwell Companions to Cultural Studies 3. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001.

Mohanty, Satya P. “Identity Politics.” In The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory, edited by Michael Ryan. Wiley, 2011.

Pickering, Michael. “Experience and the Social World.” In Research Methods for Cultural Studies, edited by Michael Pickering, 17–31. Research Methods for the Arts and Humanities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008.

What the Intellectual Dark Web understands and churches need to consider

A young man named Eutychus, who was sitting in the window, began to sink off into a deep sleep while Paul talked still longer. Overcome by sleep, he fell to the ground three floors below and was picked up dead. (Acts 20:9)

What is the Intellectual Dark Web (I.D.W.), you ask? It’s the silly, tongue-in-cheek name for a groups of “intellectuals” on both the right and left (in political terms, since that’s what they care a lot about) who have found themselves embattled with their own sides of the isle in recent years for trying to express nuanced or (to borrow another politicized term) less-than-PC opinions. This PC policing applies to both sides of the political divide, because it basically amounts to not towing the party line, and these days, the party line is drawn by the most radical voices in either party. Moderates, in other words, tend to find them selves surprised to be alienated from their own tribes.

That’s interesting, but it’s just an explanatory note. I continue to care little about politics in the conventional sense. It’s the related cultural phenomenon that has captured my attention.

The I.D.W. is taking advantage of alternative media—meaning, the internet—to talk about their views. The point of this seems to be, aside from the fact that they aren’t especially welcome in many traditional media outlets, that podcasts and online video interviews afford time to explain the nuances of their positions. Traditional media is inimical to complexity. Think of a typical news segment or panel-style program. Talking heads disagree, and some viewers find it entertaining, but no one has the chance to explain anything complex. This feeds the tendency to spout scripted talking points and encourages viewers simply to line up on their respective, predetermined sides.

Enter the long-form podcast. I’ve written before about enjoying the Joe Rogan Experience. I’ve thought a lot about why I like it. The thing is, JRE episodes are long. Granted, there are lots of episodes that I don’t care to watch. He has all kinds of guests, and a lot of them are just comedians shooting the bull for a few hours, sometimes funny, sometimes not. Astonishingly (to me), when he has on writers, academics, and public intellectuals, the episodes are not less viewed. Millions of people watch this stuff for hours. Why? How?

Doesn’t conventional wisdom tell us that the American attention span is too short? Shouldn’t a podcast be 20 minutes, maybe 30 if it isn’t to transgress the sensibilities and time constraints of a distracted, overly busy audience? Doesn’t a TED Talk have to be 18 minutes by divine decree?

The I.D.W. is following the lead of podcasters like Rogan (and he has hosted a lot of it’s leading figures). Of course intellectuals want to take a long time talking about things. The crazy thing about it is that millions of people are taking the time to listen. (Here’s an example of such a conversation, with a half million views.) More than that, people are paying money to watch these conversations live. Jordan Peterson, for example, has recently gone on tour, and he’s filling auditoriums with people who want to listen to intellectuals discuss their complicated views. Not teach. Not debate. Discuss. Here’s how he explains the phenomenon I’m talking about:

The problem with books and videos is that you can’t do anything else while you’re doing them, right? When you’re reading, you’re reading. When you’re watching a video, you can be distracted, but you have to pay attention to the video. But, if you’re listening to a podcast, you can be driving a forklift or a long haul trunk, or you can be exercising or doing the dishes. And so what that means is that podcasts free up, say, two hours a day, for people to engage in education activities that they wouldn’t otherwise be able to engage in, and that’s about 1/8th of people’s lives.

So podcasts hand people 1/8th of their life back, to engage in high-level education. I thought, “well, people actually want to do this. There’s a massive market for high-level intellectual engagement, that’s much deeper and more desperate, let’s say, than anyone suspected.” We really saw that in Vancouver. I mean, the discussion I had with Sam Harris, the two discussions—we talked about the relationship between facts and values, and science and religion more peripherally. But the dialog was conducted approximately at the level, I would say, of a pretty rigorous PhD defense.

We were only suppose to talk for an hour and go to Q&A, but the crowd didn’t want us to stop, so we talked, the first night, for two and a half hours, and the second night for two and a half hours. The crowd was 100 per cent on board the entire time. It wasn’t because Sam was winning or I was winning. Neither of us, in fact, were trying to win: we were trying to learn something, and we were actually trying to learn something. We weren’t just pretending to do that. The place erupted at the end, and I think one of the things I’ve realized in the last couple of days, as I’ve been thinking this through, is the narrow bandwidth of TV has made us think we’re stupider than we are. People have a real hunger for deep intellectual dialog, and that can be met with these new technologies. That has revolutionary significance, and that’s starting to unfold. (https://jordanbpeterson.com/transcripts/aspen/; emphasis added)

Okay, so this is really optimistic. (And that’s one of the hallmarks of the secular humanists who populate the I.D.W.) But the fact of the audience’s paid attendance is incontrovertible. If you watch these folks talking on a YouTube channel with a recorded live comments feed, you’ll quickly see that far from every view counts as intellectual engagement. Trolls will congregate. Still, the numbers are still staggering for the kind of discussion it is (and trolls won’t bother where there are no numbers in the first place).

I think Peterson is basically right about traditional media formats convincing us we’re stupider than we actually are—or more to the point, that our attention spans can only span out for binge-watching Netflix. And I think he’s right that there is really an appetite for deep intellectual dialog.

But the key factor, I suspect, is the intersection of the long-form intellectual dialog with the cultural value of authenticity. It is not just that the format gives participants room to nuance their complex viewpoints, nor just that audiences are very hungry for a higher level of discourse. Lectures, educational seminars, and debates are all available on YouTube and podcasts. Those are not commanding attention. Instead, it is live discussion with sincere attempts to understand one another, push each other for clarity, give each other the benefit of the doubt, and respond to the strongest aspects of each other’s arguments that combines with the length of the format to force participants off script.

An audience gets to watch how an intellectual forms an argument, processes pushback, clarifies an interlocutor’s point, and even changes his or her mind in real time. And we’re sure this is real because it goes for so long, there is just no way it’s scripted. Of course, going on tour (for example) means the conversation will take on a rehearsed quality, and we all end up saying repeating ourselves if we have have the “same” conversation enough times. But lengthy discussion has an interesting effect on even the most rote thoughts. Granting the intention to explain, clarify, and revise understanding, extended conversation generates a zone of intellectual honesty.

That is what I think the unexpected appetite for the long-form intellectual discourse is really about—a social need not just for complexity and nuance but for authentic dialog.

These folks are agile enough thinkers to handle a long discussion without jumbling things too badly or boring us, but there is little entertainment value in it. Rather, the authenticity of the exchange, when the goal is not to score points or dispense a canned view but to think well, is riveting.

I headed the post with reference to the Eutychus story because the phenomenon I’ve been exploring prompts me to wonder: When was the last time that someone fell of out of the second-story window of a church gathering because they were willing to be taught to exhaustion?

Eutychus is the butt of many jokes about too-long sermons and boring teachers. That’s cute, but we have to recognize that it plays into a cultural narrative about attention spans and the entertainment value of Christian preaching. More importantly, I don’t think it does justice to how deadly seriously the early church took teaching and learning.

When was the last time you even had the opportunity in church to learn more than you could stay awake for?

I have the idea that the church’s traditional media formats too have convinced us that we’re stupider than we actually are. And I also have the suspicion that the appetite for authentic theological dialog is just as great among church people as the political discussions of the I.D.W. are among their growing audience. We have a lot of tacit pedagogical rules for church that basically equate to dumb it down. And there are good (or at least reasonable) explanations for that fact. But I’m not convinced it is either necessary or useful to keep dumbing things down, compressing teaching time, and canning “our” positions for easy consumption.

The question I’m starting to ask is, how can we force ourselves off script? Because I think the church needs to recognize not only that nuance and complexity are absolute ineradicables of Christian thought but that they will also be welcome among American Christians in a context of authentic dialog in which we can all learn to think well together in the midst of substantive disagreement and misunderstanding, even though—and precisely because—it must take a long time to do so.

On Women in Church Leadership: 1 Tim 2:8–15

I began writing publicly about women in church leadership in 2014, while my family was still in Peru. I was applying to doctoral programs with the intention of studying biblical interpretation, and I was thinking a lot about the role of the biblical text in my tradition (Churches of Christ). Megan and I were also preparing to return to the US and discussing our fit among the churches that raised us, as well as our children’s future experiences. To that point, their primary experience of church had been in fully egalitarian house churches, and we grieved at the thought of ushering them into a more restrictive vision of God’s gifting of women. In that context, I wrote some preliminary thoughts about the issue (here and here), and then we got busy with the business of finishing up our time in Peru.

As it happened, we moved back to a church that was on the cusp of confronting the question of women’s roles in church, and in that context I wrote on 1 Cor 11 and 1 Cor 14. It was an opportunity for me to articulate my understanding of some key texts and to put into practice some hermeneutical commitments that I had been working on. This was an exercise as a participant observer in a church where I was both a returning missionary and an interloper, not a formal leader. I had every intention of moving on to 1 Tim 2, but I was accepted to Fuller, and once again we got swept up in a transition.

Once more, we landed at a Church of Christ that was gearing up for a long and arduous process of confronting the question of women’s participation in the body of Christ. We have had more of an insider role here, though still not a position of formal leadership. For me personally, though, there has been a strong sense of observing the process—now in another church in the same tradition with much of the same baggage, but in a very different US context. This experience has happened in parallel with my doctoral studies in theological interpretation of Scripture, so I have been, I think, an keen observer. Aside from caring deeply on a local, personal level, I always have a theoretical eye on the uses of Scripture in the tradition I feel called to serve.

This church situation has also made me hesitant to continue writing on the subject. I have expressed my opinions as a participant in the discussion, but I have been cautious about putting my thoughts in writing. Rightly or wrongly, online publication has felt risky in the contemporary social media context, even though my writing style (long words, long sentences, long paragraphs, long posts, long everything) hardly lends itself to the kind of sniping typical of the Twitter age. That is to say, I’ve been observing and reflecting on the nature of public discourse, not least in light of the current presidency. These broader dynamics have a great deal to do with the way biblical interpretation and theological leadership is unfolding in the twenty-first century—just as they did in nineteenth century during the formative era of the Stone-Campbell movement and the twentieth century during the emergence of Churches of Christ (more about which is for other posts).

Now, however, it has been over three years since my last post on the subject, and I feel ready to pick up where I left off. What animates this post in particular is a concern I believe to be at the heart of 1 Tim 2: the vital importance of Scripture’s role in the life of the local church and, by extension, the role of the church’s teachers. In the discussion about women’s roles, we find ourselves in a potentially vicious circle: to a great extent the question is about women interpreting Scripture as teachers in the church, and in order to deal with the question, the church must interpret Scripture. This circle is part of a larger one in which 1 Tim 2 takes part: the riskiness of interpreting Scripture in the context of mission raises its own challenges, and in order to deal with them, the church must risk interpreting Scripture in the context of mission.

What I’m doing and what I’m not

Let me start with some big-picture pointers.

  1. A prior theological commitment to the mission of God directs my reading of the text. In the simplest terms, I think that Scripture as a whole tells the story of God’s mission, that the church’s life is constituted by participation in that mission, and that Christian theology as a whole is derived from that participation, especially from the church’s interpretation of Scripture in virtue of that participation. This approach to the text is intertextual, because I am connecting 1 and 2 Timothy to both the rest of Scripture and the texts of Christian theology. What I notice and highlight below is a result of the intertextual connections I am making (mostly implicitly).
  2. Explicitly, I am focused on the co-textual world of 1 Tim 2:8–15, which I take 1 and 2 Timothy to comprise. Co-texts are those that surround and connect compositionally to the text being interpreted. This is commonly referred to as “context” (as in, “don’t take that word out of context”). I’m reserving context for a broader usage, however. As the common phrase “historical context” indicates, context refers to anything that goes with the text to clarify its meaning. In contrast, co-text refers only to texts that are connected compositionally to the interpreted text. Since 1 and 2 Timothy are two distinct compositions, they are not technically co-texts, but I am taking Paul’s whole correspondence with Timothy as a single composition anyway (I think there are warrants to do so, but I won’t go into that here.)
  3. The important thing is that the co-textual world of 1 Timothy 2:8–15 emerges from extensive engagement with both books as a whole. As in the previous two posts on female leadership in church, I take my time working through the words of these two books, sometimes quoting at length and highlighting Greek vocabulary that seems pertinent. Readers may find the results tedious, but the procedure is not optional in my view. I am writing within a church tradition that purports to approach the text with the utmost seriousness, and our difficulties regarding women’s roles are ostensibly because the specific words of the text matter. For that reason, the burden of this post rests on the way I understand the words of the passage’s co-textual world to relate to one another.
  4. I am not, however, advancing a historical-critical argument. While I am not only conversant with but indebted to that sort of study, I think that when engaging this discussion on a congregational level (which is where my tradition’s polity makes its decisions), we have to come to terms with the relative impotence of historical-critical methods to settle the dispute(s). I think that is the case for two reasons.
    • Generally, historical-critical scholarship has proven no more able to offer definitive answers than any other method. This is important to note precisely because it plays a modern knowledge game that pretends to offer certitude on the basis of facts (here, historical facts). Take virtually any debated issue in biblical interpretation (and a great many no one in churches bothers to debate!) and you will find a variety of interpretations of the facts. Ultimately, historical-critical scholarship is, like everyone else, playing a rhetorical persuasion game. Who can make the best case for their construal of the evidence? When regular church-goers become exasperated with biblical scholarship because it unendingly multiplies opinions, they’re right. Obviously, I don’t mean that all scholarship is useless. Nor that there aren’t ways to decide which interpretations of the historical data are more plausible. But that is all they are: decisions about plausibility. Take, for example, N. T. Wright’s argument about the significance of the Ephesian Artemis cult for understanding 1 Tim 2:11–12 (article here; video here). I find his argument to be extremely plausible—in fact, the most likely historical explanation of context. But even after reading a lot more than the average church leader or lay person about the alternative arguments, that is still the most I can say: I find X more convincing than Y and Z. That does nothing to settle the matter in a congregation and ultimately only invites the church to argue about what constitutes historical-critical plausibility or despair in the face of inconclusive historical evidence.
    • Specifically, among Churches of Christ, historical-critical scholarship is impotent because it simply is not the way our populist movement approaches Scripture. It is certainly the way our graduate theological programs do, and therefore the way our well-trained ministers might do, but that possibility has proven to have little effect on the way our churches interpret passages like 1 Tim 2:8–15. Now, I’m extremely interested in making an argument (elsewhere) that churches—I mean, the average church member—should be shaped by theological scholarship, including biblical studies. But such an argument would address the reality that the church is generally not well-formed by the tradition’s most knowledgable teachers, and in that situation it matters little what scholars have to say about any given passage. Church members and leaders bent toward study may read substantial commentaries and articles (please God!), but when it comes down to reading the text together and deciding how to live in a local context, we have to learn to approach Scripture in ways that do not depend on the rarified conversations carried out among historical-critical scholars.
  5. In the end, what I’m after here is a close reading of 1 and 2 Timothy that engenders an interpretation of 1 Tim 2:8–15. What happens if we take our time with the text and listen closely? Certainly, we are dependent on translational aids, including the insights of biblical scholars and linguists—this is an absolute fact of the church’s relationship to Scripture. But we readers also necessarily construe the passage one way or another, in relationship to its co-texts or not, with better or worse theological commitments directing our reading. I advocate here an approach that, although not simplistic, I believe congregations can follow if they indeed take the words of the text seriously.

1 and 2 Timothy: The function of Scripture in the context of mission

Yes, mission is the context. Christ “proclaimed among Gentiles, believed in throughout the world” (1 Tim 3:16) is central to the storyline of every NT text. Even granting that the pastoral epistles are steeped in a period of church institutionalization, there is no part of formalizing roles such as overseer (episkopos) or servant (diakonos) that is disconnected from the pressures and tensions of mission.

“The glorious gospel of the blessed God”  (1 Tim 1:11) has taken root in Ephesus. Now, there is a corollary issue: “sound teaching that conforms” to that message (1 Tim 1:10–11). This sound teaching is the thread that runs through 1 and 2 Tim (1 Tim 1:10; 6:3; 2 Tim 1:13; 4:3). This is not, however, the “sound doctrine” of my youth—the set of positions about which our group was right and everyone else was wrong. Though the language sounds antiquated, we have to rescue Paul’s words from those sorts of connotations so that we can hear the driving concern.

The proclamation of the gospel in historical, cultural, local contexts generates tremendous theological energy. The teaching (doctrines) that consequently come to articulation can never be something like a Platonic ideal, but they do run a massive spectrum of more or less conformity to the gospel. And conformity in turn correlates with the effects of the gospel in the life of the church. These are the stakes of teaching in Ephesus—and in our contexts today.

On the one hand, “the aim of such instruction is love that comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith” (1 Tim 1:5). These are the proper effects of teaching. On the other hand, the quality of life that results from such instruction “is right and is acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who desires everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim 2:3). In other words, this life is what God wants for his people precisely because he wants others to become his people.

Teaching results in life that results in teaching. Sound doctrine does much more than make church people right; “knowledge of the truth” is not an end in itself, because the salvation of everyone depends on the lifestyle of the church that knows the truth.

This interdependence is why the claim in 1 Tim 2:3 (that God desires everyone to be saved) is framed by an account of how Paul acted on the front end and an account of Paul’s role as herald and teacher on the back end. The phrase “I acted ignorantly in unbelief” [agnoōn epoiēsaen apistia] (1 Tim 1:13) is extremely poignant. What God makes of Paul is not a source of information but an example [hupotupōsis] (1 Tim 1:16)—therefore, God appointed him “a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth” [didaskalos ethnōnen pisteikai alētheia] (1 Tim 2:7). This interplay of doing and teaching, ignorance and truth, is the weight that rests upon the “then” [oun] of 1 Tim 2:1 and the “then” [oun] of 1 Tim 2:8:

1 Tim 2:1–6
1 Tim 2:8–15
First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all who are in high positions, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable [hēsuchion] life in all godliness [eusebeia] and dignity. This is right and is acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who desires everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God; there is also one mediator between God and humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human, who gave himself a ransom for all—this was attested at the right time.
I desire, then, that in every place the men should pray, lifting up holy hands without anger or argument; also that the women should dress themselves modestly and decently in suitable clothing, not with their hair braided, or with gold, pearls, or expensive clothes, but with good works, as is proper for women who profess reverence for God [theosebeian]. Let a woman learn in silence [hēsuchia] with full submission. I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor. Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided they continue in faith and love and holiness, with modesty.

This is a single argument, a continuous discourse on the problem identified in the opening of the letter:

I urge you, as I did when I was on my way to Macedonia, to remain in Ephesus so that you may instruct [parangeilēs] certain people not to teach any different doctrine [heterodidasalein],  and not to occupy themselves with myths [muthos] and endless genealogies that promote speculations [ekzētēseis] rather than the divine training that is known by faith [oikonomian theou tēnen pistei]. But the aim of such instruction [parangelias] is love that comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith. Some people have deviated from these and turned to meaningless talk [mataiologian], desiring to be teachers of the law [nomodidaskaloi], without understanding either what they are saying or the things about which they make assertions. Now we know that the law is good, if one uses it legitimately [ean tis autō nomimōs chrētai]. This means understanding that the law is laid down not for the innocent but for the lawless and disobedient, for the godless and sinful, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their father or mother, for murderers, fornicators, sodomites, slave traders, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to the sound teaching [tē hugiainousē didaskalia] that conforms to the glorious gospel of the blessed God, which he entrusted to me. (1 Tim 1:3–11).

That list of sins at the end of the passage is liable to distract some readers if it activates a mental schema formed by preachers firing lists of condemnations like so much guilt-coated ammunition. Paul’s point, to the contrary, is the one I’ve already highlighted: sound teaching, teaching that conforms to the gospel, is teaching that results in and derives from a kind of action—a poiēsis that I would call missional (again, see 1 Tim 1:13). The driving concern is legitimate use of the law (“law” is shorthand for Scripture, i.e., the Hebrew Bible as it was available to the church at that time).

Who are these Ephesian church members “desiring to be teachers of the law, without understanding either what they are saying or the things about which they make assertions”? The same ones teaching “profane myths and old wives’ tales” as opposed to “sound teaching” (1 Tim 4:6–7). It is not incidental that these “myths” are called graōdēs, which means “characteristic of an elderly woman.”[1. BDAG, s.v. γραώδης] Nor is it coincidental that so much of 1 and 2 Timothy is given to discussing the women of this community (but not all women in general—that is an unsustainable leap).

The women in view here seem to include a group of widows who are “gadding about from house to house [tas oikias]; and they are not merely idle, but also gossips and busybodies, saying what they should not say” (1 Tim 5:13). To conclude that this gadding and gossip are a separate issue from the unsound teaching that Paul is worried about would be a failure of imagination. This is a house church scenario. Just as life and teaching can’t be separated, neither can some imagined formal teaching and the house to house life of the church. “For among them are those who make their way into households [tas oikias] and captivate silly women, overwhelmed by their sins and swayed by all kinds of desires, who are always being instructed and can never arrive at a knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim 3:6–7). Again, before painting Paul as a misogynist, it is only fair to note that he does not say that all women are silly gossips. In fact, he is confronting the fact of the powerful agency of certain women in Ephesus who presume to teach. The problem is not that they are women but that they are wrong, and they are influential.

More specifically, the problem is threefold: bad conscience (1 Tim 1:5, 19; 3:9; 4:2; 2 Tim 1:3), deceptiveness (1 Tim 4:1–2; 2 Tim 3:4, 13), and destructiveness (1 Tim 1:10; 4:6; 6:3–4; 2 Tim 1:13; 2:17; 4:3).

Bad conscience refers to the disjunction between teaching and godliness (eusebeia). This is why Paul is so concerned with both Timothy’s teaching and his conduct. As in Paul’s ministry, they are always inseparable.

These are the things you must insist on and teach. Let no one despise your youth, but set the believers an example in speech and conduct [en logō, en anastrophē], in love, in faith, in purity. Until I arrive, give attention to the public reading of scripture, to exhorting, to teaching. Do not neglect the gift that is in you, which was given to you through prophecy with the laying on of hands by the council of elders. Put these things into practice, devote yourself to them, so that all may see your progress. Pay close attention to yourself and to your teaching [seautō kai tē didaskalia]; continue in these things, for in doing this you will save both yourself and your hearers. (1 Tim 4:11–16).

In particular, the monetary support of teachers (1 Tim 5:17–18) is a temptation for “lovers of money” who are “holding to the outward form of godliness [eusebeias] but denying its power” (2 Tim 3:2–5). Thus, Paul writes:

Whoever teaches otherwise and does not agree with the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ and the teaching that is in accordance with godliness [tē kat’ eusebeian didaskalia], is conceited, understanding nothing, and has a morbid craving for controversy and for disputes about words. From these come envy, dissension, slander, base suspicions, and wrangling among those who are depraved in mind and bereft of the truth, imagining that godliness [eusebeian] is a means of gain. (1 Tim 6:3–5).

Again, it is a mistake to imagine that this issue can be partitioned from the widows who are interested in being on the church’s list of financial dependents—the same widows “gadding about from house to house” (1 Tim 5:3–24). The “honor” of “widows who are really widows” (1 Tim 5:3) is synonymous with the “double honor” of “those who labor in preaching and teaching” (1 Tim 5:17)—not because all are teachers but because all are intertwined in the same church economy in which teaching and leadership are worthy of monetary honor.

Deceptiveness refers to a consequence of ungodliness: “the hypocrisy of liars [hupokrisei pseudologōn] whose consciences are seared with a hot iron” (1 Tim 4:2). Such people are “impostors” [goētes; lit. “swindlers”], “deceiving others and being deceived” [planōntes kai planōmenoi] (2 Tim 3:13). These words are not meant to be personal attacks. Paul is identifying a characteristic that plays an important role in the situation to which he writes. Truth and teaching are intimately bound together, not in the competitive sense (“our teaching is true, theirs is false”) but rather in the ethical sense (“their teaching is a deception, our teaching is not”).

Destructiveness refers to the opposite of soundness. “Sound teaching” is a medical metaphor: the adjectival participle translated “sound” comes from the verb hugiainō, meaning “to be in good physical health, be healthy.”[2. BDAG, s.v. ὑγιαίνω] The health vs. disease motif echoes in the phrases already quoted above in reference to the would-be “teachers”: they have a “morbid [nosōn] craving for controversy and for disputes about words,” and they are “depraved [diephtharmenōn] in mind and bereft of the truth, imagining that godliness is a means of gain” (1 Tim 6:4–5). The word translated “morbid” indeed denotes morbidity, sickness, and ailment. The word translated “depraved” connotes a sense of destruction as spoilage and wasting away. Thus, Paul associates “wrangling over words” and “profane chatter” with the imagery of destructive ulceration: “their talk will spread like gangrene” [gangraina] (2 Tim 2:14–17).

Because of contemporary usage, it is important to note that “profane chatter” here is not what we call “profanity,” as though the problem were course language or dirty jokes. Paul’s concern is about the effects (destruction, rot) caused by the opposite of “rightly explaining the word of truth” (2 Tim 2:15). This is the case every time he uses related phrases. Sound teaching is set in contrast with “myths and endless genealogies that promote speculations” (1 Tim 1:4), “profane myths and old wives’ tales” (1 Tim 4:6–7), “profane chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge” (1 Tim 6:20), “stupid and senseless controversies” (2 Tim 2:23), and, one last time, “myths” (2 Tim 4:4). For Paul, the stakes of this sort of chatter, gossip, wrangling, and speculating are the health or destruction of the community.

These themes—bad conscience, deceptiveness, and destructiveness—outline the situation that drives Paul to emphasize Timothy’s teaching role as a deacon: “If you put these instructions before the brothers and sisters, you will be a good servant [diakonos] of Christ Jesus, nourished on the words of the faith and of the sound teaching [kalēs didaskalias] that you have followed” (1 Tim 4:6). Paul advises Timothy that “the Lord’s servant must not be quarrelsome but kindly to everyone, an apt teacher [didaktikon], patient, correcting opponents with gentleness” (2 Tim 2:24–25). And “proclaim the message; be persistent whether the time is favorable or unfavorable; convince, rebuke, and encourage, with the utmost patience in teaching” [en pasē makrothumia kai didachē] (2 Tim 4:2).

(Note, by the way, that Paul’s severe judgment of the situation cannot be taken as meanness. For example, calling the controversies in question “stupid and senseless” is not a failure to be “kindly to everyone.” Paul might, of course, have failed personally in that regard many times. I simply believe that he is too calculating to let his words contradict his instructions to Timothy. Paul is way too concerned about how his conduct bears on the coherency of his message to make that kind of misstep in a composed letter. Some views are stupid, destructive, and deceptive, and Paul seems to think that discussing those sorts of judgements openly is not in conflict with the imperatives of godliness in teaching.)

For the same reasons, Paul is very concerned about Timothy’s endeavor to raise other teachers. Whoever aspires to be a spiritual overseer of the community [episkopos] must, Like Timothy (a deacon), also be “an apt teacher” [didaktikon] (1 Tim 3:2). In the midst of this situation, there is urgency in the instructions about overseers and deacons. “What you have heard from me through many witnesses entrust to faithful [pistois] people who will be able to teach [hikanoi . . . didaxai] others as well,” writes Paul (2 Tim 2:2). But the situation also call for caution: “Do not ordain anyone hastily” (1 Tim 5:22)—literally, “do not hastily lay hands on anyone” [cheiras tacheōs mēdeni epitithei]. As with Timothy’s own ordination at Paul’s hands, the requirement is “sincere faith” [tēs . . . anupokritou pisteōs]—literally, “unhypocritical faith” (2 Tim 1:5–6). This brings us full circle to Paul’s stated reason for writing 1 Timothy—the “aim” (telos) of instruction is “love that comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith” [pisteōs anupokritou].

All of these dimensions of the argument that binds 1 and 2 Timothy together converge in the famous passage about inspired Scripture:

But as for you, continue in what you have learned and firmly believed [emathes kai epistōthēs], knowing from whom you learned it, and how from childhood you have known the sacred writings [hiera grammata] that are able to instruct [sophisai] you for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus. All scripture [graphē] is inspired by God and is useful for teaching [ōphelimos pros didaskalian], for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, so that everyone who belongs to God may be proficient, equipped for every good work [pros pan ergon agathon exērtismenos]. (2 Tim 3:14–17)

From beginning to end, these letters are attuned to the “use” (1 Tim 1:8) and the “usefulness” (2 Tim 3:16) of Scripture. Its usefulness for teaching is not absolute (“inspiration” makes no such guarantees!), because it depends on legitimate use—one that results in the equipping of the church for every good work, that is, for mission. Or, to reintegrate teaching and doing once more in terms of Paul’s participation in God’s mission: “my teaching, my conduct, my aim in life, my faith, my patience, my love, my steadfastness, my persecutions and suffering” are inextricable (2 Tim 3:10).

This, then, is the context in which 1 Tim 2:8–14 should be read. It is a threefold missional context, wherein: (1) the use of Scripture is rooted in participation in God’s mission, (2) the use of Scripture is for missional ends, and (3) the inclusive nature of mission opens the church to competing claims about the value of (1) and (2).

1 Tim 2:8–15 in its threefold missional context

Returning to 1 Tim 2:8–15, let’s break it down syntactically. This exercise is more helpful using the Greek text simply because translation tends to gloss features of the syntax, but most translations that do not slide completely into paraphrasing can still be put to relatively good use. Here’s how I break down the phrasing:

I desire, then,

that in every place the men should pray,

lifting up holy hands

without anger

or argument;

also that the women should dress themselves

modestly

and decently

in suitable clothing,

not with their hair braided,

or with gold, pearls,

or expensive clothes,

but with good works,

as is proper for women who profess reverence for God.

Let a woman learn in silence with full submission.

I permit no woman

to teach

or to have authority

over a man;

she is to keep silent.

For Adam was formed first, then Eve;

and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor.

Yet she will be saved through childbearing,

provided they continue

in faith

and love

and holiness,

with modesty.

To reiterate, “then” in v. 8 is carrying forward the logic of Paul’s apostleship, namely, God “desires everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim 2:4), into this new discussion about men and women. Unsurprisingly, in light of the problem to which Paul is applying that logic—ignorance and unsound teaching—he addresses Ephesian men who are in a state of “anger and argument,” which calls to mind Paul’s self-description as “a man of violence” [hubristēn] (1 Tim 1:13) a few sentences earlier. This is in contrast to the “quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and dignity” (1 Tim 2:2) that Paul believes to be conducive to his mission and theirs. In other words, just as my reading of the co-textual world indicated, the topic doesn’t change. This is an even more vital point to emphasize as the discussion apparently moves to women’s apparel.

The phrases “that in every place the men” and “also that the women” are in parallel construction, subordinate to “I desire, then.” The “then” carries through both sets of instructions. Whereas the violence of the men is in view, the status symbols of the women are in view, and both are inseparable from the misuse of the law seen in the co-texts. I think status symbols is the right way to characterize braided hair, gold, pearls, and expensive clothes, because (1) the vocabulary (kosmiō meta aidous; v. 9) is laden with connotations of respect and honor and (2) the co-text has already indicated a problematic correlation of money, teaching authority, and honor in this setting. These women “profess reverence for God” [theosebeian] but seem to confuse status symbols with the real qualities of “godliness [eusebeia] and dignity” (1 Tim 2:2) that Paul is after. These qualities correspond not to fashionableness and wealth but to “good works” [ergōn agathōn]—precisely what Scripture rightly used should produce (2 Tim 3:17).

Therefore, the structural and thematic links extend naturally into the discussion of women learning and teaching. The “quiet and peaceable [hēsuchion] life in all godliness and dignity” that Paul wants for the whole church entails the same “silence” [hēsuchia] that he wants for these women who need to learn better how to use Scripture. It is a state of peaceableness in which one can learn to submit to sound doctrine. It should hardly need saying, this does not imply a contrast with men, as though men should learn in a state of disruption with rebelliousness. The point, as the co-texts suggest, is that these women in Ephesus, acting in just these ways, need both an opportunity and a disposition to learn, because they desire “to be teachers of the law, without understanding either what they are saying or the things about which they make assertions” (1 Tim 1:7).

Since they lack a peaceable environment and a submissive disposition, Paul instructs them not (1) to teach, or (2) to have authority (authentein) but (3) to keep silent (hēsuchia). A few translational issues arise. One, “to have authority” simply does not do justice to the dictatorial connotation that the word authentein carries. It is better translated as “to lord over” and designates a kind of power play that neither men nor women can legitimately make in the kingdom of God. Two, hēsuchia pops up once more (signaling its importance). In order to underline the sense of a peaceable environment, I’m going to use the lengthy phrase, “state of quietness without disturbance.”[3. BDAG, s.v. ἡσυχίᾳ] Three, the translation “I permit no woman” [gunaiki ouk epitrepō] is treacherous, because it conceals the fact that epitrepō is the verb governing all three phrases that follow. The awkwardness this creates is reflected in the NRSV (quoted above), which uses a semicolon to set apart “she is to keep silent” as a separate clause. Translated more rigidly, v. 12 says:

I do not permit a woman

to teach,

or to lord over a man,

but rather

to be in state of quietness without disturbance.

All three infinitives—to teach, to lord over, and to be—depend on “I permit.” But, of course, for Paul to say he “permits” a woman to be in state of quietness without disturbance undermines the force of the command. Notably, a secondary definition of epitrepō is “order, instruct”[4. BDAG, s.v. ἐπιτρέπω]. The sense of the sentence is that Paul is ordering these women to stop teaching and lording over the men of the church (apparently using their status symbols as a cudgel in service of the ambition to be teachers despite their ignorance) and to start assuming the disposition of a learner. Again, I find it impossible to think Paul would give different instructions to men who acted as these women were.

Finally, coming to the most peculiar aspects of the passage, we find the theme of deception so prominent throughout the passage’s co-textual world. If we needed more proof of how tightly connected this passage is with the problems of unsound teaching that run through both books, we find “deceiving others and being deceived” [planōntes kai planōmenoi] in 2 Tim 3:13 to be synonymous with the terminology of the biblical story that Paul uses to interpret these women: “the woman was deceived [exapatētheisa] and became a transgressor” (1 Tim 2:15). For that is what Paul is doing: interpreting them with the biblical story—reading them into Eve’s being deceived.

The point needs some emphasis. It is a mistake to take Paul’s use of Scripture here simply to be an exegesis of Gen 3, as though he were finding in the story of Adam and Eve a set meaning like, “Women are prone to deception, but men are not, therefore women should not teach in the church.” He is not taking a universal meaning from Genesis and applying it to all women; rather he starts with the specific problem of these Ephesian women and holds the biblical text up to them as a mirror. He does the same with the entire Corinthian church, men and women: “But I am afraid that as the serpent deceived Eve by its cunning, your thoughts will be led astray from a sincere and pure devotion to Christ” (2 Cor 11:3). The reason Paul can use Gen 3 for both women and men here, then women alone in 1 Tim 2:14, is that he is not excavating a single, determinate meaning and “applying” it. Rather, in both cases, being deceived is the situational concern, and he is calling for those who are deceived to identify themselves as deceived by finding themselves in the symbol of Eve.

Of course, the gravity of that identification is not the status “deceived” but the consequences it carries. We have already seen that the consequences of unsound teaching are, for Paul, the driving concern. Sound teaching results in the equipping of the church for good works—for mission. Unsound teaching results in decay and destruction of the community. The pivot in v. 15 (“yet”) is Paul clarifying that finding themselves in the symbol of Eve does not mean that they should also read themselves into the “curse” of Gen 3:16. This clarification is necessary because Eve’s confession, “The serpent tricked (ēpateēsen; LXX) me, and I ate” (the only place where Paul’s deception vocabulary appears in the Greek Old Testament version of the story) leads directly into God’s declaration of the consequences. The last thing Paul wants is to suggest that the “faith and love and holiness” (2 Tim 2:15) of a Christian woman make no difference for the story of humanity’s being deceived. Quite the opposite: the sound teaching that “Christ Jesus came into the world to save (sōsai) sinners” (1 Tim 1:15) is what will lead “everyone to be saved (sōthēnai) and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim 2:4), including women who “will be saved (sōthēsetai) through childbearing.” The details of this expression have confounded biblical interpreters since shortly after Paul penned them, but I’m not worried about a solution, since it does not bear directly on the question of female leadership. It seems clear to me, in any case, that Paul is nuancing his use of the Eve story: identify yourself in Eve’s being deceived, but do not forget that we are in Christ, the new Adam (cf. “in the Lord” in 1 Cor 11:11). Paul wants these women to start acting and thinking like they are “in Christ.” To do that, they need to recognize that they have been deceived, but that recognition should not lead them to think they are “in Eve.”

So how have they been deceived? The same way we all are—by competing accounts of truth. Paul’s persistent criticism of controversy, disputes, wrangling, chatter, contradictions, and, above all, myths signals the powerful presence of competing claims “falsely called knowledge” (1 Tim 6:20). Who calls them knowledge? Obviously, the women in question, but more importantly, the intellectual and cultural leaders who have shaped their thinking. In other words, as in every mission context, we are dealing with the collision of worldviews (“myths” is a key word here) and, more to the point, the use of Scripture in the midst of that convergence.

Let me repeat the threefold missional context of biblical interpretation outlined above: (1) the use of Scripture is rooted in participation in God’s mission, (2) the use of Scripture is for missional ends, and (3) the inclusive nature of mission opens the church to competing claims about the value of (1) and (2). The major issue in Ephesus is (3). The major issue, in other words, is not simply that converts in the cultural context of Ephesus carry residual beliefs and practices that are incompatible with the gospel. That is always the case in every culture—it is a boring observation. The major issue is that certain women holding to these beliefs and practices are also making a bid to become teachers, directly undermining both the use of Scripture rooted in participation in God’s mission and the equipping of the church for participation in God’s mission. In this context, Paul commands these women not to teach but to learn.

Back to the tensions of a missional reading

In our current context, a similar dynamic prevails. Because the same theological impulse that brings Paul to say that in Christ there is neither male nor female (again, see here) animates missional theology, missional ecclesiology is essentially inclusive, so a missional reading of 1 Tim 2:8–15 might result in a gender-inclusive interpretation. Yet, I think the dynamic in contemporary missional ecclesiology is actually more complex than simply letting that theological anthropology guide the reading (which is also a legitimate move for a congregation at a different place in the hermeneutical circle).

In the present context, it is not simply that patriarchy is a false understanding of the relationship between men and women in Christ, though it is that. Egalitarians will call patriarchy an invasion of cultural values foreign to the gospel, and complementarians will say the same of the apparently late-modern gender roles that egalitarians espouse. But I think the subtler issue is that missional ecclesiology today comes after the fact of church patriarchy, which means that the inclusiveness of the ecclesiology that would affirm the equal calling and gifting of men and women in Christ also entails inclusiveness toward those already in the church who are carrying forward a commitment to the tradition of patriarchy. Not for nothing, it is often traditionalist women who insist that women must not teach (yes, the irony should be palpable).

Let me be more specific. Sound missional ecclesiology entails the practice of inclusive, communal reading and interpretation of Scripture, a practice in which the whole community, gifted for participation in God’s mission, reads Scripture as participants in God’s mission, in order to equip one another for participation in God’s mission. By virtue of that commitment, missional churches are necessarily inclusive toward those who would advance an inherited patriarchal understanding of 1 Tim 2:8–15.

In other words, as 1 and 2 Timothy has taught us, a missional hermeneutic leaves us open to viewpoints are in conflict with the use of Scripture rooted in participation in God’s mission and with the use of Scripture for missional ends. This is no less the case when the competing claims are brought forth from church history.

The inclusiveness of missional ecclesiology occasions another problem consonant with those in Ephesus: the ignorant are included. I’m taking a page from Paul here, so “ignoran” is not an insult but a description. Ignorance is the state of lacking knowledge. It is a natural state. We all begin there in regard to everything and remain there in regard to many things. But that doesn’t make it virtuous or desirable.

In my tradition, however, the cultural current of anti-intellectualism that pervades our approach to spirituality and, in particular, biblical interpretation makes ignorance into a virtue. This is a huge topic on which I intend to write a lot more, but the short of it is that our profoundly populist movement believes in the capacity of the average, uneducated Bible reader to find the “plain” or “simple” meaning of Scripture. The Bible “says what it means and means what it says.” The meaning is “black and white.” In the case of 1 Tim 2:12, the meaning is plain: “I permit no woman to teach.” Simple. Done.

Any claim to a more complicated interpretation of 1 Tim 2 crashes into the cultural commitment to the virtues of uneducated readers and the simplicity of Bible reading. And any more complicated missional interpretation of 1 Tim 2, by virtue of its inclusiveness, opens itself to the ignorance inherent in this anti-intellectual church culture. This dynamic is not identical to the situation in Ephesus, because these women may have been very well educated in the so-called knowledge that Paul rejects. In fact, that may be what made some of them think they should be teachers. Nonetheless, I see a striking parallel between their ignorance of sound teaching and the ignorance that traditionalist, anti-intellectual church culture promotes.

So, I think Paul would say something similar to the church today: women should use Scripture as participants in mission, women should use Scripture to equip the church for mission, and whoever teaches that women should not use Scripture in these way needs to stop teaching and find a quiet place to learn.

A missional reading of 1 Tim 2:8–15 reveals a tension inherent in reading Scripture missionally: The exclusion of people from full participation in the life of the church—including congregational interpretation of Scripture—on the basis of gender or education is incompatible with missional theology. Yet, Paul excludes some from teaching because of their ignorance—ignorance about the gospel, about the inseparability of teaching and participation in mission, and about the legitimate use of Scripture. The ignorance of church members is a missiological problem, then and now. We have to ask: Who is able to handle the law? Who is able to teach faithfully? Who is able to equip the church for good works? Our inclusiveness must live in tension with the requirement that some members of the community learn instead of teaching—whether that teaching would be done from a formal position of authority, as participants in a Bible study, from house to house, or through any of the many ways that theological influence is actually exercised. This tension between inclusiveness and legitimate use of Scripture is vital for missional hermeneutics, especially in populist, congregationalist traditions like mine.


Notes